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Junior from Kalamazoo, Michigan, Dottie Ca1tland skins Skinner and presents .. 
THE FIGHT FOR FREE WILL 
BY DoTriE CARTLAND 
Conformity, cont1"0l, cultural enginem·ing-ambiguous words that 
emerge again and again in convocation speeches and classroom dis-
cussions; sometimes regarded with patronizing benevolence, clothed 
in "glittering generalities;" more often scorned, painted in blackest 
hues, and posed as evil adversaries of the ever-combatant "Free 
Will." Is it possible to analyze these concepts objectively, to ex-
amine them as neither bogies nor saviors of society? How im-
portant is their influence on the behavior and thinking of modern 
man? 
We are constantly reminded that the American people operate 
en masse, that there is a growing b·eod toward conformity. No 
longer can we find the "inner-directed" mao, whom David Reisman 
described in The Lonely Crowd, one who is guided as by a personal 
gyroscope. In his place we have the "other-directed" individual, 
whose sole equipment for gaining experience is a set of antennae. 
Thus he functions merely as a receiving set for group ideas. No 
one likes to think of himself as a chameleon-like creatme who takes 
on each changing shade of his environment. If we accept this 
interpretation, we find omselves a sadly degenerate humanity! 
Joseph Wood Krutch, in The Measure of Man, writes words of 
hope to those of us who view with alarm the increasing obscmity 
of human values. It is his contention that we need not sacrifice 
om belief in the free will of mao. He launches a vigorous attack 
on the materialistic system of thought devised by Freud, Marx, and 
Darwin, and adopted by B. F. Skinner, twentieth centmy behaviorist 
psychologist. 
Members of our psychology department at Denison have allied 
themselves with Skinner in maintaining that the concept of Free 
Will merits careful re-examination. Current developments in the 
science of the mind require us to take a realistic rather than an 
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. alistic view. On the basis of Dr. Skinner's textbook. A Science 
1de H man Behavior and his novel, Walden Two, I have attempte~ 
of u mise how he would reply to the criticisms Krutch makes of his 
tosur . ld .. ch ·shed theory, envuonmenta etermrmsm. 
en In his analysis of om so-called "Age of Anxiety," Krutch holds 
the people of almost every period in history have had the same 
that think f tl · tim" hondriacal tendency to o 1err own es as more 
hypOCbl d than those of previous generations. Psychologists might 
trou e . . th . 
with that name for this age Wlth one reservation: at man IS 
agree ally a worrying animal-that he always has been anxious and 
~=ys will be. What then-we may ask-makes the distinctive 
mood of an age? 
Krutch believes that what we think is related to what happens, 
and that by a continued pessimistic attitude _we gt~d~ ou:selves 
d a conviction of coming disaster-and this conVlction ill turn 
towar . 1 ·th hi b comes synonymous with the disaster itself. Goillg a ong WI s 
e orun· g we must renounce absolute predestination, for whenever reas , . . 
we "guide omselves," regardless of the direction ill which _we move, 
demonstrate that fate is not the arbitrary ruler of om lives. But 
~utch's analysis can be disputed-and would be by Skinner. _It 
is e>>perience which creates the mood of an age-tl1e psychologist 
would say-and om age of anxiety is the result of two world wars 
and an economic depression. This emphasis on cause and effect 
clearly illustrates Skinner's deterministic philosophy. 
The morass in which we of the mid-twentieth century appear 
to be foundering might be attributed to a cultmal lag: man's in-
genuity has oub"Un his intelligence. When wisdom and good do 
not keep pace with the necessity for them, says Krutch, we have 
two alternatives: we can simplify, in the manner of Thoreau, by 
returning to a political and social order which we would be capable 
of managing; or we can "get wise," as was advised by H. G. Wells. 
Skinner would elaborate on Wells' contention for wisdom by en-
couraging the development of a science of human beha~or; thus he 
would help decrease the differential between our relatively meager 
understanding of people and om encyclopedic knowledge of tech-
nology and of the physical world. . . 
Krutch stands firmly in his belief that there IS such a thing 
as free will-that man has the ability to recognize good and evil 
and to make decisions accordingly-for without this belief we would 
be powerless to act at all. "Not sol" our beh~vorist ps~chol~gist 
would reply. "When a mao is able to recogniZe that his actions 
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are determined by conb:olling factors in his environment, and when 
he learns what these factors are, he comes closer to freedom than 
does the man who assumes that human behavior is capricious and 
unpredictable." 
Marx, Freud, and Darwin were all engaged in desb:oying 
belief in man's autonomy and in proving that the human is a product 
of forces outside his control. Building on the premises that ( 1) 
man is an animal, and ( 2) an animal is a machine, their logical 
conclusion was that man is a machine. Krutch accuses them of 
choosing the mechanical aspect of man because it was the easiest 
to study; he states defiantly that this is not the complete answer 
to an understanding of mankind. For example, the elecb:onic cal-
culator is as close to having human qualities as a machine can come, 
for it can "think." But it is not conscious of itself; it is not capable 
of imagination, curiosity, emotion, sympathy; nor can it have pref-
erence. These qualities compose what Krutch calls the "universe 
of consciousness," which distinguishes man from both animal and 
machine. 
"Perhaps so," Skinner might say, 'out looking at man as a 
machine is a beginning toward a scientific knowledge about him, 
and it gives us something practical on which to base our studies. 
If we can discover, through experiments with a rat or a dog, useful 
principles which are effective in dealing with human beings, why 
shouldn't we assume that man has certain mechanical qualities? 
We should be thankful for the similarities that exist between animals 
and humans!" 
Another fear Krutch expresses is that "merely by being treated 
as though he could do nothing for himself man is, perhaps, becoming 
less capable of doing so." If he can do nothing for himself, will 
there be any limits on what may be done to him? Skinner would 
answer reassuringly that not only are people constantly being con-
n·olled by those around them, but they in tum are exercising con-
trol over others in various ways. It is a two-way proposition, so 
the danger of one person becoming overly-persecuted is relatively 
small. 
In a chapter entitled "Ignoble Utopias," Krutch gives his evalua-
tion of the Walden Two community-or "institution," as he calls it. 
In speaking of Frazier's "scientific ability to control men's thoughts 
with precision, thereby causing them to think benevolently and 
tolerantly," he points out the horrifying idea that Walden Two is 
devoid of thinking individuals! The products of such a conditioning 
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would be something less than human. Frazier-who is the 
age~c:J])an for Skinner in the novel-might defend himself with this 
P0. :on of the "end-justifies-the-means" rationalization: "When 
,·ar: cate people to think benevolently and tolerantly I am merely 
I e .u g into immediate practice what theologians and moralists 
put!J!lbeen advocating for centw:ies. They may criticize my methods, 
bave mine have b r o ugh t results w h e r e theirs have failed." 
}~t reinforce his position Skinner might also quote Henry Huxley, 
who said: 
If some great power would agree to make me always think 
what is true and do what is right, on condition of being 
turned into a sort of clock and wotmd up every morning 
before I got out of bed, I should instantly close with the 
offer. 
1n his re-examination of our society's value judgments and of 
the ultitnate ends we seek to attain, Krutch criticizes Skinner's def-
inition of the "good life" -that which connibutes to the health of 
the individual and the long-continued smvival of the society-by 
asking, "smvival for what?" This proves a difficult question for me 
to answer on Skinner's behalf, and I can only guess at his possible 
reply: "'The Walden Two society should smvive to produce great 
works of rut, literatme, and music." At least its residents had plenty 
of leisure to devote to such pastimes-tl1ough I question whether 
leisure is tl1e only condition conducive to outstanding creativity. 
Shouldn't we reverse the situation, however, and ask the theologians, 
philosophers, and artists, "What do you wish to smvive for? What 
basically ru·e you trying to do?" When we consider carefully their 
ultimate goals, we are apt to admit that most of them are striving 
to end man's inhumanity to man, to devise a way for people to live 
together comfmtably and enjoy the wonders of God's world. Even 
the satirists and natmalists in literatme, for example, pmsue these 
same ends when they point up the worst in life so that people will 
strive for, and appreciate the best . In the light of this argument, 
kinner could say that in the Walden Two community he has al-
ready achieved the goals which make the smvival of a society 
worth while. 
In my opinion, one of Krutch's strongest arguments against 
the environmental determinists is that they are so dogmatic-they 
take the "nothing but" attitude that man is the product of the 
economic, sociological, and psychological factors in his past history 
and can therefore have no autonomous powers. While Krutch has 
devised a minimal definition of a man, the behavorists have taken 
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the maximal view. Admitting that we are far from being 
autonomous, Krutch at the same time denies that we are 
powerless to control our own behavior. The "Minimal Man," 
is even sometimes capable of independent choices-even if they 
nothing more than tastes or preferences-is not completely the 
of environment. His reasoning is something more than mere 
alization. He is both an individual and part of an aggregate. 
an individual he can exercise free will but as part of a group 
behavior is primarily determined. In short, Krutch is saying, 
must be aware of the extent to which one is free." Skinner 
say, "One must be aware of the extent to which one is 
These men represent two poles of the magnet we see as 
will. Krutch stands as a positive force, Skinner as a negative. 
of us may choose either pole we prefer. The choice itself gives 
couragement to the believer in autonomous man. On the 
hand, the person making the decision b1istles with positive or 
tive ions he has acquired tlu·ough his living with others-ions 
will ultimately determine the direction of his attraction. 
